A device is only trustworthy until its shared secret leaks.
TigerTrust roots device identity in the TPM you already shipped. Every certificate request is gated by a signed measurement of the firmware that made it — so a cloned or reflashed device stops getting certificates the moment it drifts.
The device fleet you shipped last quarter is already a soft target.
Most connected-device programs still ship a shared enrollment secret baked into firmware. It gets extracted the first time a motivated attacker owns a single unit — and from that point on, any device that can present the secret gets a legitimate certificate. Rotation means a firmware release. Revocation means a CRL nobody polls.
The path forward is the TPM you’re already paying the BOM cost for. IEEE 802.1AR gives us a per-device Initial Device Identity (IDevID) burned in during manufacture, and a Local Device Identity (LDevID) issued after remote attestation of the running firmware. TigerTrust operates both.
The result: a certificate request from a device that has been reflashed with unauthorised code fails. A device with a stolen shared secret fails. A device that has been cloned onto different silicon fails. The pipeline of trust survives even if the network doesn’t.
Bind identity to silicon, not shared secrets.
During manufacturing, the TPM's Endorsement Key becomes the anchor for an IEEE 802.1AR IDevID. On first boot in the field, TigerTrust's Credential Activation flow proves the requesting device holds the AK bound to that EK — before a single LDevID is issued.
- Endorsement Key ceremony captured during manufacture
- Credential Activation binds each Attestation Key to the manufacturer EK
- IDevID issued at line-end, LDevID issued after field attestation
- Bulk-import EK catalogue from contract manufacturers
Certificates gated on what the device is running now.
Every LDevID issuance checks a signed quote of the TPM's Platform Configuration Registers. Policies describe what firmware, secure-boot state, and PCR values are acceptable — and reject requests that don't match. Silent trust in shared secrets ends here.
- PCR-gated issuance policies (e.g. PCR0-7 must match golden image)
- Continuous re-attestation with configurable cadence
- Sub-minute auto-revocation when a device drifts
- Signed EAT reports exported to your SIEM
One console for 180 thousand devices.
Cohort filters by firmware version, geography, or attestation posture. Bulk rotate a segment, quarantine a segment, or force re-attestation on suspicion — without a firmware release.
- Cohort filters: firmware, region, model, attestation status
- Bulk rotate / quarantine / force re-attest with audit trail
- API + webhook hooks for existing fleet consoles
- CRL propagation to devices within 60 seconds of revocation
An attested device programme, delivered.
802.1AR IDevID + LDevID
Silicon-anchored identity issued at line-end and re-issued after field attestation.
TPM 2.0 everywhere
Infineon, STMicro, Nuvoton, Intel PTT.
PCR-gated issuance
Deny reflashed / rooted devices.
Cohort operations
Rotate, quarantine, revoke by segment.
Sub-minute revoke
Signed CRL to every device in <60s.
Manufacturer catalogue
Bulk EK import from contract manufacturers.
“We ship connected diagnostic hardware into hospital networks. Regulators used to want proof our devices could not be spoofed. Now we hand them a signed attestation for every device and the conversation ends.”
Attest a real device on the call.
Ship us a unit, or bring one you're building. We'll enrol it, quote the PCRs, issue an LDevID, and then re-flash it and watch the pipeline fail — live.