Domain Control Validation
Also known as: DCV, domain validation, identifier validation
Domain Control Validation (DCV) is the process by which a certificate authority proves that the entity requesting a certificate for a domain actually controls that domain. Every publicly trusted TLS certificate goes through DCV before issuance.
What DCV is
DCV is the gatekeeping step in TLS certificate issuance: before a CA can issue a cert for example.com, it has to confirm that whoever is asking for it controls example.com. The CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements define the permitted DCV methods, and every publicly trusted CA must use one of them.
The methods have evolved considerably over time. The 2026-2029 window is a particularly active one for method deprecation, as the CA/B Forum tightens the set of acceptable methods.
The current permitted methods
HTTP-01 / Web server file challenge
The CA generates a token; the applicant serves that token at a known URL on the domain (http://example.com/.well-known/acme-challenge/<token>). The CA fetches the URL, confirms the token matches, and considers the domain controlled.
- Automatable: yes
- Can issue wildcards: no
- Still permitted after 2028: yes
DNS-01 / TXT record challenge
The CA generates a token; the applicant publishes a TXT record at _acme-challenge.example.com with that token as its value. The CA resolves the record and validates.
- Automatable: yes (requires DNS API access)
- Can issue wildcards: yes (the only method that can)
- Still permitted after 2028: yes
tls-alpn-01 / TLS ALPN challenge
The CA initiates a TLS handshake using the acme-tls/1 ALPN protocol; the applicant responds with a self-signed certificate containing the token in a specific extension.
- Automatable: yes
- Can issue wildcards: no
- Still permitted after 2028: yes
Email-based validation
The CA sends a verification email to one of five fixed addresses on the domain (admin@, administrator@, hostmaster@, postmaster@, webmaster@) or to the registrant's contact email in the WHOIS record. The applicant clicks a verification link in the email.
- Automatable: barely (requires an email inbox and a click)
- Retiring: 2028. After this date, email-based DCV is no longer permitted for publicly trusted TLS certificates.
Phone-based validation
The CA calls a phone number from the registrant's WHOIS or domain contact and asks for a spoken verification code.
- Automatable: no
- Retiring: March 2027. The CA/B Forum has set a hard end-date.
The retirement timeline
| Method | Status |
|---|---|
| HTTP-01 | Permitted indefinitely |
| DNS-01 | Permitted indefinitely |
| tls-alpn-01 | Permitted indefinitely |
| Phone-based validation | Retires March 2027 |
| Email-based validation | Retires 2028 |
For operators still using email or phone validation anywhere in their renewal pipeline, the migration deadlines are firm. The shape of the migration is: move to protocol-based DCV (HTTP-01 for single certs, DNS-01 for wildcards), automate it through an ACME client, and delete the human-in-the-loop steps.
DCV reuse
CAs are permitted to reuse a successful DCV result for up to some validity window — meaning subsequent certificate issuances to the same account for the same domain don't require re-running the challenge. The window has been tightening alongside certificate validity:
| Date | Max validity | Max DCV reuse |
|---|---|---|
| Pre-March 2026 | 398 days | 398 days |
| From March 2026 | 200 days | 200 days |
| From March 2027 | 100 days | 100 days |
| From March 2029 | 47 days | 10 days |
At 10-day DCV reuse (post-2029), every certificate renewal cycle will trigger a fresh DCV. Automation is no longer optional.
MPIC and DCV
Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration (MPIC) means DCV is performed from multiple network perspectives simultaneously. If a CA only reached your /.well-known/acme-challenge/ URL from one network vantage, an on-path BGP hijack could spoof the validation. MPIC requires the CA to see consistent results from 3+ perspectives before accepting.
For operators: firewall and WAF rules that whitelist specific CA source IPs break under MPIC — the CA now reaches your endpoint from several network paths. Allow the full set.
Common operational mistakes
- Relying on email DCV. It's going away in 2028. Migrate now.
- Hardcoding specific CA IP ranges in firewall allowlists. MPIC breaks this. Allow the challenge path broadly, or use DNS-01.
- Shipping HTTP-01 behind an HTTPS-only redirect. The ACME challenge must be reachable on port 80. Many web stacks force HTTPS redirect; this breaks the challenge.
- Using DNS-01 with a DNS provider without API access. You'll be manually updating records every renewal. Pick a DNS provider with an API or move the zone.
Related reading
- CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements §3.2.2.4
- RFC 8555 — ACME protocol (the challenge definitions)
Related terms
Put this into practice
TigerTrust operationalises everything in this glossary - from Certificate Lifecycle Management to TPM 2.0 attestation and post-quantum readiness.
Last updated: October 28, 2026